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In the debate about the optimal institutional design of central banks,
independence and conservatism are usually considered to be the most im-
portant ingredients for a stable and successful monetary policy. Building on
Rogo￿ (1985), it is argued that delegating monetary policy to an independent
and conservative central bank will improve its credibility and deliver, on av-
erage, a lower and less variable rate of in￿ation, albeit at the price of higher
output variability.1 In the literature about monetary policy delegation, how-
ever, most papers treat central bank independence and conservatism as a
joint variable. Both institutional features are usually modelled by a unique
parameter representing the relative weight attributed to in￿ation stabilisa-
tion in the central bank’s objective function. Yet, independence and conser-
vatism (henceforth, respectively CBI and CBC) are two di￿erent concepts:
Independence refers to the central bank’s ability to determine monetary pol-
icy without facing pressures from the government, while conservatism refers
to the fact that the central bank assigns a higher relative weight to in￿ation
control than society and the governement do. In this paper, we explicitly
distinguish between CBI and CBC in order to examine the optimal com-
bination between those monetary regime features. This is done by means
of a model of endogenous monetary policy delegation where the government
(the principal) chooses the central bank (agent)’s degree of independence and
conservatism so as to minimise the society’s loss function.
Up to now only few papers have allowed for a formal distinction between
CBI and CBC.2 An important ￿rst study is the paper by Eij￿nger and
Hoeberichts (1998). Using a Barro-Gordon type model, they introduce an
explicit parameter for independence in a monetary policy model with a con-
1The literature relating to the discussion about the design of monetary institutions is
much too broad to be completely referenced here. It includes seminal contributions by, for
instance, Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogo￿ (1985), Alesina
and Tabellini (1987), Cukierman (1992), Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997), Cukierman
and Lippi (1999). Recent surveys include Berger et al. (2001), Siklos (2008), Laurens et
al. (2009), and Hayo and Hefeker (2010).
2In the empirical literature, most papers construct indices of central bank characteris-
tics that combine information on the legal independence with information on the in￿ation
aversion of the central bank (see, for example, Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) or
Alesina and Summers (1993)). Notable exceptions are the papers by de Haan and Kooi
(1997), Berger and Woitek (2005) and, more recently, Berlemann and Hielscher (2010)
that propose separate indices for independence and conservatism.
2servative central banker. The central bank is assumed to face pressures from
the government when setting its monetary decisions. This idea is captured
by the fact that the loss function that e￿ectively governs monetary policy is
a weighted average of the central bank’s loss function and the government’s
loss function. CBI is then de￿ned as the strength of the central bank in nego-
tiations with the government about monetary policy. Within this framework,
they show that there exists a continuum of combinations of CBI and CBC
that may be socially optimal. More important, these optimal combinations
reveal the existence of a trade-o￿ between independence and conservatism.
This implies that if, for some reason, the government decides to reduce the
central bank’s independence, it is optimal for society that the central bank
adopts a more conservative attitude. 3
More recently, Eij￿nger and Hoeberichts (2008) have shown that the
trade-o￿ between CBI and CBC also holds within a New Keynesian frame-
work. Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2005) and Weymark (2007) examine
the optimal combination of CBI and CBC in a model with strategic interac-
tion between monetary and ￿scal authorities, while Lippi (2000) studies how
the optimal degrees of independence and of conservatism are related to social
preferences (as represented by the median voter preferences). A common re-
sult of these papers is that they identify independence and conservatism as
potential substitutes, suggesting that it is possible to compensate a lack of
independence by appointing a more conservative central banker.
In this paper, we add another dimension to the analysis of the optimal
combination of CBI and CBC by introducing uncertainty about the central
bank’s preference parameters. The assumption is that the government and
the private sector do not perfectly know the central bank’s preferences. The
current debate about central bank transparency and communication suggests
that the degree of predictability of central bank behavior will have a signif-
icant in￿uence on the performance of monetary policy. Such an uncertainty
plays a crucial role in practice and could therefore have important conse-
quences for the design of monetary institutions. 4 The objective of this paper
is to highlight the implications of this uncertainty for the optimal combi-
3Although the level of independence is usually determined by law, the central bank has
some degree of freedom in choosing the degree of conservatism.
4Goldberg and Klein (2010) show that the initial years of the European monetary union
where characterised by a signi￿cant degree of uncertainty about the ECB’s preferences.
Berger et al. (2009) show that there still seems to be uncertainty about the ECB’s policy
reactions in parts of the common monetary area.
3nation of independence and conservatism. More precisely, the question is
whether independence and conservatism remain substitutes when consider-
ing the possibility that the central bank’s preferences and thus its policy
decisions may not be fully predictable.
To formalise the interference of the government in a conservative central
bank’s decisions, we use a New Keynesian framework which is extended to
allow for uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences. The source of this
monetary uncertainty varies across studies. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986),
for instance, consider uncertainty about the relative weight that the central
bank puts on the output gap compared to in￿ation. Geraats (2005), alterna-
tively, allows for shifts in the central bank’s in￿ation target. As in Faust and
Svensson (2001, 2002), Jensen (2002) and more recently Westelius (2009), we
assume that there is some uncertainty about the central bank’s output gap
target. This uncertainty could be explained by a lack of central bank trans-
parency, i.e. the fact that central banks are somewhat reluctant to disclose
information about their policy objectives. 5 An alternative explanation would
be the one proposed by Westelius (2009), suggesting that the central bank’s
uncertain output gap target re￿ects its measurement errors of the potential
output level. This explanation seems particularly relevant when considering
the case of a central bank - like the European Central Bank (ECB)- that op-
erates in a monetary union formed by countries with heterogenous economic
structures.
A series of papers has investigated the reaction of the public (the private
sector and the government) to uncertainty in monetary policy. 6 Sorensen
(1991) and Gr￿ner et al. (2009), for instance, consider the wage setters’
reaction to uncertain central bank preferences, whereas Hefeker and Zimmer
(2009) study the in￿uence of monetary uncertainty on ￿scal policies. The
focus in this paper, however, is more normative. Closest in spirit to our
analysis are papers by Beetsma and Jensen (1998) and Muscatelli (1999)
that examine the implications of uncertain central bank preferences for the
optimal design of monetary institutions. They demonstrate in particular that
high conservatism may be desirable in the presence of monetary uncertainty
5See, for instance, Mishkin (2004) and Cukierman (2002, 2009).
6Again, there is a broad literature on the general issue of monetary uncertainty, too
large to be fully referenced here. Important contributions are the papers by Brainard
(1967) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), for instance. Recent surveys include Blinder
et al. (2008), Crowe and Meade (2008), Geraats (2009), and Dincer and Eichengreen
(2010).
4as it helps to reduce the volatility of central bank decisions. These studies
however only consider the extreme case of full central bank independence.
In this paper, we provide new insights into the workings of delegation
arrangements for monetary policy. In particular, we show that when uncer-
tainty about the central bank’s output gap target is high, a positive correla-
tion may emerge between the optimal degrees of central bank independence
and conservatism. This result implies, in particular, that rendering the cen-
tral bank more independent increases the need for conservatism. Intuitively,
this happens because when more autonomy is delegated to a central bank
whose output gap objective is highly uncertain, society faces the risk of a
potential increase in the volatility of monetary decisions . To avoid excessive
variability of macroeconomic outcomes, it is then in the interest of soci-
ety to select a central banker who focuses on the in￿ation objective, which
is clearly de￿ned. By taking into account the uncertainty surrounding the
central bank’s preferences, our analysis ￿nally quali￿es the result of sub-
stitutability between CBI and CBC, indicating that these parameters may
become complements when monetary uncertainty is high.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section
describes our formal framework. The optimal arrangement between CBI and
CBC is examined in section 3, and concluding remarks are o￿ered in section 4.
2. The New Keynesian framework with monetary uncertainty
This section presents a simple version of a New-Keynesian model (see,
for instance, Clarida et al., 1999 or Woodford, 2003). The development
of in￿ation is derived under the assumption of a monopolistic competition
where optimizing ￿rms adjust their prices in a staggered, overlapping way.
The aggregate supply curve is thus represented by a forward-looking Phillips
curve which takes the form:
πt = αxt + βEtπt+1 + et (1)
where πt is the in￿ation rate; xt is the output gap de￿ned as output relative
to its equilibrium level under ￿exible prices (normalized to zero), and Etπt+1
is the expected future in￿ation rate (with Et denoting the expectations op-
erator). The discount factor is denoted by β and the sensitivity of in￿ation
to the output gap is measured by α. The larger the value of α, the greater is
the ￿rms’ ability to adjust their prices in response to changes in the current
5output gap. Finally, et represents a cost push shock which exhibits some
degree of persistence measured by the coe￿cient 0 ≤ ρ < 1:
et = ρet−1 + µt with µt ∼ N(0,1) (2)
The government aims to minimise a loss function de￿ned over in￿ation









where λG measures the government’s relative concern with price stability.
Since the government is elected, it can reasonably be assumed that it shares
the society’s objectives. We therefore refer to (3) as the society’s loss function
as well.
Like the government, the central bank (CB) seeks price stability and






t + (xt − t)
2 (4)
where λCB denotes the degree of central bank in￿ation aversion and t denotes
the central bank’s stochastic output gap target, with E(t) = 0 and V (t) =
σ2
.7 The key feature of our model is that the central bank’s output gap target
is not fully known by government and society at the moment monetary policy
is decided. This idea is captured by the presence of the random variable t.
We hence assume that society appoints a central banker with an output
gap target that coincides on average with its own (and the government’s)
output gap target but where there is still some uncertainty around it which
is measured by σ2
. The larger is σ2
, the higher is the uncertainty surrounding
the central bank’s output gap target.
Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002) and Jensen (2002) interpret the stochas-
tic portion of the central bank’s preferences as arising from the way the struc-
ture of the central bank aggregates heterogeneous societal preferences. Shifts
in the central bank’s output gap target could for instance result from changes
in the composition of the policymaking board. Westelius (2009) suggests an
alternative explanation by assuming that the central bank’s stochastic output
gap target re￿ects measurement errors of potential output. This explanation
7Note that in our analysis the central bank’s preference shock t is only transitory. For
a study where this shock has a persistent component, see for instance Faust and Svensson
(2001, 2002) and Westelius (2009). Moreover, we assume that the preference shock t is
independent of the cost-push shock et, so that Et (tet) = 0.
6is particularly relevant in the case of a common central bank that sets pol-
icy in a monetary union formed by countries with heterogeneous economic
structures. Measurement errors of the monetary union-wide potential out-
put can for instance arise from the central bank’s di￿culty to appreciate the
individual member countries’ e￿ort in implementing labour market reforms
or productivity-enhancing expenditures on infrastructure, education etc. We
follow Westelius (2009)’s explanation in the remainder of the paper. 8
In our analysis, we allow for the possibility of the government to interfere
in monetary policymaking. The central bank is not fully independent in
the way it sets monetary policy so that the loss function that e￿ectively















t + γ (xt − t)
2 + (1 − γ)x
2
t (5)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 denotes the strength of the central bank in the negotiations
with the government or its political independence; φ = λCB−λG measures the
level of central bank conservatism. In what follows, we derive the optimal φ.
It should be stressed that this optimal degree of central bank conservatism is
a relative measure as it denotes the (positive) di￿erence between the central
bank’s in￿ation aversion and that of the government (or society). 9 Hence,
the central bank may for instance be highly averse to in￿ation (high λCB)
without being conservative (φ = 0). This is the case when the government
or society is highly in￿ation averse as well. Moreover, as can be seen from
(5), the monetary policymakers’s expected output gap target is set to zero,
indicating that there is no desire to reach an overoptimistic output level
and thus no in￿ationary bias exists. Conservatism thus only impacts on the
degree of shock stabilization but does not a￿ect average in￿ation.
The interaction between the government and the central bank can be de-
scribed by the following sequence of events: In the ￿rst stage, the elected
government determines the central bank’s institutional design. More specif-
ically, it chooses γ and φ so as to minimise its expected loss function (3). In
8More speci￿cally, we assume that the central bank cannot directly observe ˆ yt, the
economy’s potential output, but it can estimate it. Let ˆ yCB
t be the central bank’s esti-
mation of potential output so that ˆ yCB
t = ˆ yt + t. The central bank’s measurement error
of potential output is thus simply equal to: ˆ yCB
t − ˆ yt = t. Considering the expression of
the output gap : xt = yt − ˆ yt, the central bank’s objective to stabilise output around (the
central bank’s estimation of) its potential level can ￿nally be written as: yt−ˆ yCB
t = xt−t.
9The distinction between the "conservatism" and the "in￿ation aversion" of the central
bank also appears in Lippi (2000).
7the second stage, monetary policy is implemented and economic outcomes
(xt,πt) are realized. The game is solved by backward induction.
Under discretionary policy, the monetary authority minimizes its loss
function (5) subject to the Phillips curve (1) taking in￿ation expectations as
given. The respective ￿rst order condition can be written:






According to this optimality condition, the central bank responds to a
rise in in￿ation by contracting demand which re￿ects a ￿leaning against the
wind￿ policy. The strength of this response positively depends on both,




, the weight attached to
in￿ation stabilisation in the objective function (5). Monetary policy is also
positively a￿ected by t, the central bank’s stochastic output gap target. A
negative realisation of t for example ￿ which means that the central bank
underestimates the economy’s output potential ￿ leads to a contraction of
the economy. The in￿uence of t is ampli￿ed by the degree of independence
γ, as independence allows the central bank to pursue its individual output
gap target to a larger extent. This possibility is obviously not given when
γ = 0. In this respect, independence matters for monetary policy even if the
central bank has the same degree of in￿ation aversion as the government so
that the degree of conservatism is nil (i.e. φ = λCB − λG = 0).10
By combining the Phillips curve (1) with the optimal monetary policy
rule (6), we obtain the following expressions for the equilibrium in￿ation and
output gap (see Appendix A for details):
πt =
αγ
α2 (λG + γφ) + 1
t +
1










α2 (λG + γφ) + 1 − βρ
et (8)
It is clear from Eqs. (7) and (8) that the equilibrium in￿ation rate and
output gap depend positively on the central bank’s (stochastic) ouptut gap
target t. Indeed, if the central bank for instance overestimates the economy’s
output potential, its output gap target t is positive. It is, therefore, induced
to implement too an expansionary monetary policy which, in turn, results
10However when γ = 0, the degree of central bank conservatism does not matter for
monetary policy. The central bank’s preferences obviously do not in￿uence policy in that
case.
8in in￿ationary pressure. Unsurprisingly, the strength of the impact of t on
xt and πt positively depends on γ, the central bank’s ability to determine
monetary policy independently.
The equilibrium expressions for output gap and in￿ation rate are also
a￿ected by et. A positive cost-push shock causes in￿ation to rise above its
optimal level (which is set to zero, corresponding to price stability), inducing
the central bank to contract demand. Moreover, it appears that an increase
in the degree of the bank’s conservatism φ ￿ and thereby in the ￿e￿ective￿
weight for in￿ation stabilisation (λG+γφ) ￿ reduces the impact of cost-push
shocks on in￿ation whereas it ampli￿es the impact of these shocks on the
output gap. We thus have the standard result that optimal conservatism
trades o￿ price stability and output gap stabilisation.
As is clear from expressions (7) and (8), the transmission of cost-push
shocks et to the output gap and in￿ation rate is not a￿ected by the cen-
tral bank’s preference shock t. This is due to the fact that the preference
shock concerns the central bank’s targets and not the relative weight of its
objectives.
It is also of interest to determine the volatility of macroeconomic outcomes
and to study how this is a￿ected by institutional parameters such as central
bank conservatism and independence.11 Determining the variance of the




























These expressions highlight the two sources of macroeconomic volatility
in our model, that is: uncertainty about the central bank’s output gap target
￿ which is represented by the ￿rst term on the right hand side of expressions
(9) and (10) ￿ and cost push shocks ￿ corresponding to the second term.
Considering the impact of independence and conservatism on in￿ation and
output variability yields the following results.
Result 1: An increase in the degree of central bank conservatism
11Note, from expression (3), that the expected social losses simply amount to the
weighted sum of the variances of in￿ation and output, namely EtLG
t = λGV (πt) + V (xt).
12The cost-push shock et is described by the AR(1) process: et = ρet−1 + µt, with




9(i) reduces in￿ation variability,
(ii) may reduce output gap variability if the degree of monetary uncer-
tainty σ2
 is relatively high and the degree of cost-push shock persistence ρ
relatively low.
Proof (i) From expression (9), it is easy to see that:
∂V (πt)
∂φ < 0.















, which can become
negative for su￿ciently high values of σ2
 and su￿ciently low values of ρ.
The ￿rst part of result 1 is conventional in the literature initiated by Ro-
go￿ (1985). Central bank conservatism helps to attenuate in￿ation variability
whatever the nature of the shocks a￿ecting the in￿ation rate. The second
part of result 1 is less standard: Conservatism might help to attenuate output
gap volatility under certain conditions. To understand the intuition under-
lying this result we have to realize that central bank conservatism a￿ects the
output gap variance via two channels that operate in opposite directions. On
one hand, the higher is the central bank’s concern with price stability the
lower is the macroeconomic volatility stemming from its output gap target.
On the other hand, conservatism involves a trade-o￿ between in￿ation and
output gap variability due to cost-push shocks: a higher φ reduces in￿ation
variability but at the expense of more output gap variability. The strength
of the former e￿ect positively depends on σ2
, the uncertainty about the cen-
tral bank’s output gap target, whereas the strength of the latter e￿ect is
positively related to the variance of cost-push shocks and thereby to ρ, the
persistence of these shocks.13 Hence, when σ2
 is relatively high and ρ is rela-
tively low, the ￿rst mechanism dominates the second and the overall impact
of conservatism on output gap varability is negative.
Result 2: Granting greater independence to the central bank
(i) increases output gap volatility,
(ii) is likely to increase in￿ation variability if φ, the degree of conser-
vatism, is relatively low and σ2
, the uncertainty about the central bank’s out-
put gap target, is relatively high.
13See footnote 12 for the expression of V (e).
10Proof (i) From expression (10), we can see that:
∂V (xt)
∂γ > 0.
















This expression becomes positive for relatively high values of σ2
 and low
values of φ. In particular, it is positive for φ = 0.
The ￿rst part of result 2 is consistent with the discussions and the empiri-
cal results in the literature (see for instance, Cukierman and Lippi, 1999). In
our analysis, higher central bank independence increases output gap volatil-
ity for two reasons. The ￿rst hinges on the fact that giving greater autonomy
to a central banker whose preferences are not clearly de￿ned exacerbates the
uncertainty about monetary policy decisions. This in turn translates into
higher macroeconomic volatility. The second reason only appears if the cen-
tral bank is conservative (φ 6= 0), i.e. more concerned about price stability
than society and the governement. Higher independence then allows the cen-
tral bank to better focus on in￿ation stabilisation at the cost, however, of
less output gap stabilisation.
The second part of result 2 is novel. Central bank independence is likely
to exacerbate in￿ation variability. Indeed, when the uncertainty about the
central bank’s output gap target σ2
 is high, the macroeconomic volatility-
increasing e￿ect of independence may dominate its in￿ation stabilisation im-
pact. This is the case if greater independence is given to a central bank with
a relatively low degree of conservatism. In particular, if the central bank
is not more concerned about price stability than the government ( φ = 0),
higher central bank independence unambiguously leads to higher in￿ation
volatility.
It is noteworthy in our analysis that when the uncertainty about the cen-
tral bank’s output gap target is high, independence and conservatism do not
have the same e￿ect on macroeconomic volatility: independence exacerbates
the volatility generated by uncertain central bank preferences whereas con-
servatism helps to attenuate this kind of uncertainty. This result underlines
the importance of disentangling CBI and CBC for a better understanding
of the e￿ects of monetary delegation arrangements in the presence of uncer-
tainty about the central bank’s output gap target.
3. The optimal design of central bank institutions
11We now turn to the choice of the optimal degrees of conservatism φ∗ and
independence γ∗ from the point of view of society. To do so, we consider a
model of endogenous delegation where the government selects φ∗ and γ∗ so as
to minimise society’s loss function. We assume that these regime parameters
are de￿ned before monetary policy decisions are taken which re￿ects the fact
that the monetary regime is revised less frequently than policy decisions are
taken.
Integrating the expressions for equilibrium output gap and in￿ation into
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The ￿rst term is due to the in￿ation and output gap volatility arising
from the uncertainty about the central bank’s output gap target ( σ2
 > 0).
As we saw before, this term increases with γ, the bank’s independence, and
decreases with φ, its degree of conservatism. The second term corresponds to
the volatility of output gap and in￿ation that is related to cost-push shocks.
3.1 Optimal conservatism
In this section, we ￿rst examine the optimal degree of conservatism for a
given level of central bank independence, ¯ γ.
Minimising the expected social loss with respect to φ, the degree of central
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The ￿rst term is always negative and re￿ects the fact that greater central
bank conservatism φ reduces the volatility arising from the bank’s uncertain
output gap target. The second term can be positive or negative, depending
in particular on the size of φ. This term highlights the trade-o￿ between
in￿ation and output gap stabilisation arising from the optimal choice of φ:
a higher φ implies better in￿ation stabilisation but at the cost of less output
gap stabilisation. Since the ￿rst term is negative, the optimal φ must be
large enough for the second term to become positive. Accordingly, the opti-
mal degree of central bank conservatism will be su￿ciently high so that the
marginal cost (less output gap stabilization) of an increase in φ outweighs
12its marginal gain (better in￿ation stabilization). Hence, in the presence of
uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences some extra conservatism is
required.









λG + ¯ γφ

+ 1 − βρ
3 σ2

(1 − βρ)[α2 (λG + ¯ γφ) + 1]
3 +
λGβρ
¯ γ (1 − βρ)
≡ f (φ, ¯ γ)
(13)
To ￿nd the optimal value of φ and to study its comparative static prop-
erties, we use a graphical method illustrated in Appendix B. 14 From this
graphical analysis, we derive the following result.
Result 3: (i) For a given level of central bank independence, the optimal
degree of conservatism is positively related to σ2
, the degree of uncertainty
about the central bank’s output gap target.
(ii) The optimal degree of conservatism increases with ¯ γ, the given de-
gree of central bank independence when σ2
, the uncertainty about the central
bank’s output gap target, is relatively high and provided β and ρ are not too
large.
Proof (i) From expression (13), it is easy to see that
∂f
∂σ2
 > 0. Hence, a rise
in σ2
 causes an upward shift of function f and thereby raises φ∗.









(1 − ρ2)B2 [AB + 3α2βρ¯ γφ]
(1 − βρ)A4 −
λGβρ
¯ γ2 (1 − βρ)
where A = α2  
λG + γφ

+ 1 and B = α2  
λG + γφ

+ 1 − βρ. This deriva-
tive becomes positive ￿ implying a positive relation between φ∗ and ¯ γ ￿ for
su￿ciently high values of σ2
 and provided that β and ρ are not too large.
According to the ￿rst part of result 3, in the presence of high uncertainty
about the central bank’s output gap target, it is optimal for society to select
a policymaker who assigns a relatively large weight to his in￿ation target
in order to limit the volatility of his decisions. As a consequence, central
bankers whose output gap target is clearly de￿ned can be allowed to be
less conservative. A similar result has been found by Beetsma and Jensen
14See also Cukierman (1992) and Eij￿nger and Hoeberichts (1998).
13(1998).15
The second part of result 3 shows that, when the central bankers’ output
gap target is highly uncertain, giving them more autonomy increases the need
for conservatism. To understand the intuition underlying this result, consider
￿rst the case without uncertainty. When σ2
 = 0, the optimal degree of central
bank conservatism is φ∗ =
λGβρ
¯ γ(1−βρ). It is obvious from this expression that
φ∗ is inversely related to ¯ γ, indicating that central bank independence has
a negative impact on the optimal level of conservatism. Independence then
helps to reduce the need for conservatism

∂f
∂¯ γ < 0

as both monetary policy
features have similar e￿ects on the balance between in￿ation and output gap
stabilisation.
However, when there is some uncertainty about the central bank’s out-
put gap target, the impact of independence on the optimal degree of con-
servatism may be reversed. An increase in the degree of independence then
has two countervailing e￿ects on the need for conservatism. On one hand,
it reinforces the weight the monetary authority places on in￿ation stabili-
sation and thereby helps to reduce the need for conservatism. This e￿ect
only exists when there is some persistence of the cost-push shock ( ρ > 0).
On the other hand, granting higher independence to a central bank whose
preferences are highly uncertain exacerbates the volatility of its decisions.
This in turn increases in￿ation and output gap variability and should there-
fore be compensated by greater conservatism. If the uncertainty surrounding
central bank preferences is high and the persistence of cost-push shocks is
not too important, the second e￿ect is likely to dominate. Central bank in-
dependence then has a positive impact on the optimal degree of conservatism.
3.2 Optimal independence
We now consider the choice of the optimal degree of central bank inde-
pendence for a given level of conservatism, ¯ φ.
Minimising the expected social loss function with respect to γ, the degree
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15Beetsma and Jensen (1998) however consider uncertainty in the weight the central
bank assigns to its in￿ation and ouptut objectives.
14The ￿rst term is positive and highlights the fact that central bank inde-
pendence aggravates macroeconomic volatility due to uncertain central bank
preferences. The second term can be positive or negative, re￿ecting the
trade-o￿ between in￿ation and output gap stabilisation that arises from the
optimal choice of γ: a higher γ implies better in￿ation stabilisation ￿ pro-
vided ¯ φ > 0 ￿ but at the cost of less output gap stabilisation. Since the ￿rst
term is positive, the optimal γ must be su￿ciently small for the second term
to become negative. As a consequence, the central bank should be given less
independence when there is some uncertainty about its preferences.
Rearranging condition (15), we have:
γ =
¯ φβρλGα2A3
α2¯ φ2 (1 − βρ)A3 + σ2
 (1 − ρ2)(α2λG + 1)





where A = α2  
λG + γφ

+ 1 and B = α2  
λG + γφ

+ 1 − βρ.
It is easy to see from this expression that a government which is not
concerned with price stability (λG = 0) has no reason to delegate monetary
policy to an independent (and thus conservative) central banker. 16 The same
result holds when there is no persistence of cost-push shocks ( ρ = 0).
As before, we use a graphical method to determine the optimal degree
of central bank independence, γ∗, and its comparative static properties (see
Appendix C). Our results are summarised as follows:
Result 4: (i) For a given level of conservatism, the optimal degree of central
bank independence decreases with respect to σ2
, the degree of uncertainty
about the central bank’s output gap target.
(ii) The optimal degree of central bank independence increases with ¯ φ, the
degree of central bank conservatism, when the latter is not too high and for
relatively high levels of uncertainty about the central bank’s output gap target,
σ2
.
Proof (i) From expression (15), it is obvious that:
∂g
∂σ2
 < 0. This means that
a rise in σ2
 induces a downward shift of function g and thereby reduces γ∗.
(ii) To understand how ¯ φ a￿ects the optimal degree of central bank inde-
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16Indeed, γ∗ = 0 when λG = 0 (as well as φ∗ = 0, according to Eq. (13)).
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where D = α2φ(1 − βρ) + σ2





The expression in square brackets is negative provided that ¯ φ is not too
large. The sign of the expression in curly brackets may then become negative
as well for su￿ciently high values of σ2
. In this case,
∂g
∂¯ φ > 0, implying that
γ∗ is positively related to ¯ φ.
The intuition underlying part (i) of result 4 is obvious: it is in society’s
interest to limit the central bank’s independence if the uncertainty surround-
ing the latter’s decisions is high. Part (ii) of result 4 suggests a positive
relationship between the optimal degree of independence and the degree of
conservatism for high values of σ2
 and low values of ¯ φ. Indeed, in this case
￿ according to result 2 (ii) ￿ a large degree of CBI may be associated with
high in￿ation variablity that should be compensated by greater conservatism.
Hence, society is less willing to hand over power to a central bank (low γ∗)
that places too much importance on its uncertain output gap objective (low
φ).
3.3 The optimal combination of independence and conservatism
The combination of the ￿rst order conditions (Eqs. (13) and (15)) allows
us to study the nature of the relation between the optimal degrees of CBI
and CBC. We derive the following result:
Result 5: Central bank independence and conservatism are likely to become
strategic complements when the uncertainty concerning the central bank’s out-
put gap target, σ2
, is high.
Proof According to results 3 and 4, φ∗ is positively related to γ and γ∗ is
positively related to φ, for su￿ciently high values of σ2
.
When there is no uncertainty about the central bank’s output gap tar-
get σ2
 = 0, independence and conservatism are strategic substitutes. 17 This
17When σ2
 = 0, the ￿rst order conditions (13) and (15) reduce to the following equation:
16result is in the line with the ￿ndings of Lippi (2000), Hughes Hallett and
Weymark (2005) and Weymark (2007). By allowing for some uncertainty in
the central bank’s preferences, however, our analysis extends their ￿ndings.
It turns out that when there is great ambiguity about the central bank’s
output gap target, φ∗ and γ∗ are positively correlated, suggesting that in-
dependence and conservatism should be treated as complements rather than
substitutes.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the optimal arrangement between independence
and conservatism in the presence of uncertainty about the central bank’s out-
put target. The main ￿nding is that, in the presence of such uncertainty, the
optimal arrangement between CBI and CBC is not necessarily characterised
by substitutability. Instead, if the ambiguity about the central bank’s output
gap target is su￿ciently high, CBI and CBC complement each other. This
suggests that giving high (low) independence to the central bank is likely to
increase (decrease) the need for conservatism in some situations. Intuitively,
giving greater autonomy to a central bank whose preferences are uncertain
exacerbates the volatility of monetary policy decisions. It may therefore
become optimal for society to appoint a more conservative central banker
in order to compensate for this additional volatility. One policy conclusion
would therefore be that discussions about the appropriate combination of
independence and conservatism should not overlook the issue of the central
bank transparency and the degree of uncertainty about its policy targets.
An interesting possible application of our study could be in the context
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), where we have a common
central bank which is at the same time very independent and very conser-
vative, a combination that would be hard to rationalize if independence and
conservatism are considered to be substitutes. Although the ECB’s priority
for price stability is clearly articulated for all to understand, there is greater
ambiguity concerning its output objective when the in￿ation rate is low. Our
analysis suggests that under such circumstances the ECB’s degree of indepen-
dence and conservatism are likely to be complements. To take the analysis
one step further, one might argue that the ECB’s high independence could
be one additional reason for its relatively great conservatism. Besides being
φ∗ =
λβρ
γ∗(1−βρ), clearly showing that there is subsitutability between φ∗ and γ∗.
17desired for historical or political considerations, this large degree of conser-
vatism may be required due to the ECB’s high independence. Indeed, the
delegation of the monetary instrument to a supra-national authority whose
output objective is not clearly de￿ned creates additional uncertainty in the
member states. Since the member states’ national authorities are not allowed
to interfere in the ECB’s decisions, it is in their interest to make sure that
priority will be given to the price stability objective ￿ which is clearly de-
￿ned ￿ and therefore to select a highly conservative central banker to avoid
excessive monetary uncertainty.
18A Derivation of the equilibrium output gap and in￿a-
tion rate
Inserting the optimality condition (6) into the New Keynesian Phillips
















Since the relevant state variables in (17) are t and et, it is apparent that
xt will be of the form:
xt = b0t + b1et (18)
Forwarding Eq. (18) and taking expectations with respect to the public’s
information set we get:
Etxt+1 = b1ρet (19)









α2 (λG + γφ) + 1
(20)
Comparing (20) and (18), we can solve for the coe￿cients b0 and b1:
b0 =
γ







α2 (λG + γφ) + 1 − βρ
(22)
The equilibrium output gap can then be written:
xt =
γ






α2 (λG + γφ) + 1 − βρ
et (23)
The equilibrium expression for in￿ation is derived by inserting (23) into
the optimality condition (6) and rearranging:
πt =
αγ
α2 (λG + γφ) + 1
t +
1
α2 (λG + γφ) + 1 − βρ
et (24)
B Graphical analysis of the optimal φ
Figure 1 represents function f(φ, ¯ γ) on the right hand side of Eq. (13).
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Figure 1: Determination of the optimal degree of CB conservatism
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(1 − βρ)[α2 (λG + ¯ γφ) + 1]
5 (26)
This expression becomes negative ￿ implying that f(φ,γ) is concave ￿ for
su￿ciently low values of β and ρ and/or su￿ciently large values of λG and
¯ γφ.
The left-hand side of Eq. (13) is a 45 ￿line through the origin. The inter-
section point between the 45 ￿line and the function f curve gives the optimal
degree of central bank conservatism φ∗.18 The comparative static properties
of φ∗ can be derived from the partial derivatives of function f. If f shifts
upward (downward), the intersection point shifts to the right, implying an
increase (a decrease) in φ∗.
C Graphical analysis of the optimal γ
Figure 2 represents function g(γ, ¯ φ) on the right hand side of Eq. (15). A
study of the properties of this function reveals that it is monotonically falling
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Figure 2: Determination of the optimal degree of CB independence
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3 (A + βρ)
i
which is positive for su￿ciently low values of ρ and β, implying that function
g(γ, ¯ φ) is convex with respect to γ.
The left-hand side of Eq. (15) is represented by a 45 ￿line through the
origin. The optimal degree of central bank independence γ∗ is thus given by
the intersection between the 45 ￿line and the function g curve. If g shifts
upward (downward), the intersection point shifts to the right (left), implying
an increase (decrease) in γ∗.
21References
Alesina, A, Tabellini, G (1987), Rules and discretion with uncoordinated mon-
etary and ￿scal policies, Economic Inquiry, 25, pp 619￿630.
Alesina, A, Summers, L (1993), Centrel bank independence and macroeco-
nomic performance: Some comparative evidence, Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 25, 151￿162.
Barro, R, Gordon, D (1983), A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural
rate model, Journal of Political Economy, 91, pp 589￿610.
Beetsma, R, Jensen, H (1998), In￿ation targets and contracts with uncertain
central banker preferences, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , 30, pp
384￿403.
Berger, H, Ehrmann, M, Fratscher, M (2009), Forecasting ECB monetary
policy: Accuracy is a matter of geography, European Economic Review,
53, pp 1028-1041.
Berger, H, Eij￿nger, S, de Haan, J (2001), Central Bank Independence: Up-
date on Theory and Evidence, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, pp 3￿40.
Berger, H, Woitek, U (2005), Does conservatism matter? A time-series ap-
proach to central bank behaviour, The Economic Journal, 115, pp 745￿766.
Berlemann, M, Hielscher, K (2010), E￿ective monetary policy conservatism:
A comparison of 11 OECD countries, HWWI Research Paper 2-21.
Blinder, A, Ehrmann, M, Fratscher, M, de Haan, J, Jansen, D (2008), Cen-
tral bank communication and monetary policy: a survey of theory and
evidence, Journal of Economic Literature, 46, pp 910￿945.
Brainard, W (1967), Uncertainty and the e￿ectivness of policy, American
Economic Review, 57, pp 411￿425.
Clarida, R, Gali, J, Gertler, M (1999), The science of monetary policy: A new
keynesin perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 37, pp 1661￿1707.
Crowe C., Meade E., 2008. Central bank independence and transparency:
evolution and e￿ectiveness. European Journal of Political Economy 24,
22763￿777.
Cukierman A. (1992) Central bank strategy, credibility and independence.
Cambridge. MIT Press.
Cukierman A., 2002. Are contemporary central banks transparent about eco-
nomic models and objectives and wht di￿erence does it make? Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 84, 15￿45.
Cukierman A., 2009. The limits of transparency. Economic Notes 38, 1-37.
Cukierman A., Lippi F., 1999. Central bank independence, centralization
of wage bargaining, in￿ation and unemployment - Theory and evidence.
European Economic Review 43, 395￿1434.
Cukierman A., Meltzer A., 1986. A theory of ambiguity, credibility and in-
dependence under discretion and asymmetric information. Econometrica
54, 1099￿1128.
Cukierman A, Webb, S. B., Neyapti, B (1992), Measuring the independence
of central banks and its e￿ect on policy outcomes, World Bank Economic
Review, 6, pp 353￿398.
Dincer N., Eichengreeen B., 2010. Central bank tranparency : causes, conse-
quences and updates. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 11, Article 5.
Eij￿nger S.C.W., Hoeberichts M., 1998. The trade o￿ between central bank
independence and conservativeness. Oxford Economics Papers 50, 397￿
411.
Eij￿nger S.C.W., Hoeberichts M., 2008. The trade o￿ between central bank
independence and conservativeness in a New Keynesian framework. Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy 24, 742￿747.
Faust J., Svensson L.E.O., 2001. Transparency and credibility: monetary
policy with unobservable goals. International Economic Review 42, 369￿
397.
Faust J., Svensson L. E. O., 2002. The equilibrium degree of transparency
and control in monetary policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 34,
520￿539.
23Geraats P., 2005. Transparency and reputation: the publication of central
bank forecasts. Topics in Macroeconomics 5, 1￿26.
Geraats P., 2009. Trends in monetary policy transparency. International
Finance 12, 235￿268.
Goldberg L., Klein M., 2010. Establishing credibility : evolving perceptions
of the European Central Bank, in: Clarida, R., Giavazzi, F. (Eds.), NBER
International Seminar on Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press,
forthcoming.
Gr￿ner H. P., Hayo B., Hefeker C., 2009. Unions, wage setting and monetary
policy uncertainty. B.E. Journals of Macroeconomics 9, Article 40.
de Haan, J, Kooi, W (1997), What really matters: conservativeness or inde-
pendence ?, Banca Nazionale de Lavoro Quarterly Review , vol 200, pp.
23￿38.
Hayo, B., Hefeker, C., 2010. The Relationship between Central Bank Indepen-
dence and In￿ation, in: Siklos, P., Bohl, M., Wohar, M. (Eds.), Frontiers
of Central Banking. Cambridge University Press, 179-217.
Hefeker C. and Zimmer B., 2009. Uncertainty and ￿scal policy in an asym-
metric monetary union. Open Economies Review, forthcoming.
Hughes Hallett A., Weymark D., 2005. Independence before conservatism:
transparency, politics, and central bank design. German Economic Review
6, 1￿21.
Jensen H., 2002. Optimal degrees of transparency in monetary policymaking.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104, 399￿422.
Kydland F., Prescott E., 1977. Rules rather than discretion: The inconsis-
tency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy 85, 473￿490.
Laurens B., Arnone M., Segalotto J. F., 2009. Central bank independence,
accountability, and transparency : a global perspective. Palgrave Macmil-
lan.
Lippi F., 2000. Median voter preferences, central bank independence and
conservatism. Public Choice 105, 323￿338.
24Mishkin S. F., 2004. Can central bank transparency go too far?, in: Future
of In￿ation Targeting, Reserve Bank of Australia, 48￿66.
Muscatelli A., 1999. Optimal in￿ation contracts and in￿ation targets with un-
certain central bank preferences: Acccountability through independence?
Economic Journal 108, 529￿542.
Rogo￿, K., 1985. The optimal degree of commitment to a monetary target.
Quartely Journal of Economics 100, 1169￿1190.
Siklos P., 2008. No single de￿nition of central bank independence is right for
all countries. European Journal of Political Economy 24, 802￿816.
Sorensen J., 1991. Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance.
Economics Letters 37.
Svensson L., 1997. Optimal in￿ation targets, ’conservative’ central banks, and
linear in￿ation contracts. American Economic Review 87, 98￿114.
Walsh C., 1995. Optimal contracts for central bankers. American Economic
Review 85, 150￿167.
Westelius N. J., 2009. Imperfect transparency and shifts in the central bank’s
output gap target. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 985￿
996.
Weymark D., 2007. In￿ation, government transfers, and optimal central bank
independence. European Economic Review 51, 297￿315.
Woodford M., 2003. Interest and prices: foundations of a theory of monetary
policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
25